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Rutherford and Ray think that human beings have mental mechanisms that help them to detect individuals that, deliber-
ately, do not follow a rule. In the same way, they hold that autism is not a disorder in which these mechanisms are dam-
aged. This idea seems contrary to the thesis, supported by some researchers, that autistic people have a theory of mind 
defi cit. This is because of, if Rutherford and Ray are right, autistic people can detect other people’s intentions. In this 
paper, Rutherford and Ray’s experiment is analyzed and it is concluded that they do not prove that people with autism 
can understand intentions. Such an experiment only shows that autistic people and general population share common 
logical-linguistic abilities. 
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INTRODUCTION
Education faces many challenges at present. 
One of them refers to the need to address stu-
dents that, for whatever reason, do not have the 
same intellectual abilities as general population. 
Research on autism spectrum disorders is espe-
cially relevant in this way. Undoubtedly, it is im-
portant to detect, and to know, the real thinking 
and reasoning abilities that students with autism 
have in order to plan and schedule educational 
interventions adapted to their true needs and 
their personal characteristics.
In recent times, from cognitive science, in-
teresting studies intended to analyze autistic 
thought have appeared. Thus, a famous experi-
ment that has been replicated many times is rep-
resentative: the false belief task. Van Lambalgen 
and Smid (2004) state that this task is often used 
in order to check the way in which autistic peo-
ple reason with regard to other people’s beliefs. 
They expose several versions of the false belief 
task, but, in general, it can be said that such a 
task consists of the following: the participant, 
the researcher, and a witness (the witness can 
be, for example, a doll or participant’s mother) 
see that an object (for example, a chocolate bar) 
is put into a place (for example, a box). When 
the witness leaves, the object is put into another 
place (for example, a drawer). When the witness 
comes back, the participant is asked where the 
object will be looked for by the witness.
According to Van Lambalgen and Smid (2004), 
there is a critical age. Children under three and 
one-half years of age usually answer that the 
witness will think that the object is where it is 
really, that is, in the second place. Nevertheless, 
children older than three and one-half years of 
age generally answer that the witness will think 
that the object is in the fi rst place because he (or 
she) has not seen that the object has been put 
into another place. In this way, Van Lambalgen 
and Smid (2004) indicate that the problem is that 
autistic children older than that age continue to 
believe that the witness will think that the object 
is in the second place. In their opinion, those re-
sults have been considered to be a demonstration 
that autism is linked to a theory of mind defi cita. 
They say that that idea was raised by Leslie in 
1987 and that it is based on the hypothesis that 
human beings have, as a result of evolution pro-
cess, a reasoning module that is related to the 
understanding of the other person’s minds and 
that is thought to be damaged in autistic people.
Nonetheless, Rutherford and Ray (2009) seem 
to question this idea. In their view, it is not clear 
that a theory of mind defi cit can explain autism. 
In clinical setting, autistic people is thought to 
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have diffi culties regarding the interpretation of 
other people’s mental states and their intentions, 
but Rutherford and Ray (2009) state that these 
theses, which, in their opinion, are similar to 
those that can be found in papers such as the one 
of Baron-Cohen et al. (1985), are debatable, and 
that their experiments do not support them.
It is obvious, therefore, that this issue is clear-
ly relevant in the educational sphere, because an 
appropriate knowledge of the autistic mind is 
necessary in order to design adequate teaching 
strategies for students with autism, and in order 
to pose objectives, contents, and didactic meth-
ods for that kind of students. For these reasons, it 
is advantageous to analyze the research present-
ed by Rutherford and Ray (2009). It is impor-
tant to check whether that research offers new 
data about autism spectrum, or whether, on the 
contrary, their experimental results can be inter-
preted in accordance with other approaches that 
are more consistent with the previous researches 
on this problem area. The next part of this paper 
reviews the arguments exposed by Rutherford 
and Ray (2009).
1. SOCIAL CONTRACTS AND AUTISM
According to Rutherford and Ray (2009), usu-
ally, it is thought that it is not diffi cult for autistic 
people to detect the other individuals’ intentions 
in a general way, but in a specifi c way. People 
with autism can capture the other persons’ needs 
and wishes, and physical causality related to ob-
jects and human beings. It is only problematic 
for them to note other people’s intentions, and, 
in their opinion, this thesis is held by Baron-Co-
hen (1995).
However, they do not seem to share this ap-
proach and think that there are evidences that can 
question it. In their view, if: a) there are adap-
tive rules and evolved mechanisms that regulate 
social exchanges; and b) specifi c experiments 
are designed to analyze them; then c)  it can be 
shown that, at least apparently, people with au-
tism can detect, to some extent, other individu-
als’ bad intentions.
The theory that states that there are such adap-
tive rules and evolved mechanisms is well-known 
in the fi eld of psychology of reasoning and in the 
area of cognitive science. That theory, which is 
the theory that Rutherford and Ray seem to as-
sume, is called the social contracts theory (Cos-
mides, 1989; Gigerenzer and Hug, 1992; Fid-
dick et al., 2000; Fiddick and Erlich, 2010; Cos-
mides et al., 2010). The researchers that support 
the social contracts theory often use versions of 
the famous Wason selection task (Wason, 1966, 
1968) in which a situation of social exchange 
is described in order to get experimental sup-
port for their theses. Thus, they try to compare 
the results of those versions with the results of 
versions of the same task that do not describe 
situations of social exchange. In this way, it is 
argued that, given that the versions with social 
contracts (that is, with social exchanges) gener-
ally offer, in a signifi cant way, better results than 
the versions without social contracts, it is obvi-
ous that human mind has mechanisms and rules 
related to social exchanges. In their opinion, the 
selection tasks with social contracts trigger the 
action of such rules and mechanisms, which, in 
essence, are useful in order to detect agreements 
violators and rules offenders.
Nevertheless, Rutherford and Ray (2009) 
seem to assume that there is an element that is 
the most important one in order to trigger the 
mechanisms and rules related to social contracts. 
That element is not that the version of the task is 
expressed as a social contract. It is that the ver-
sion indicates the need to detect malicious cheat-
ers in which trust cannot be put. This need is re-
ally important for people, because, if they want 
to achieve their purposes in society and to avoid 
diffi culties and problems in their daily lives, they 
must know who usually respect agreements and 
who generally does not follow norms.
Based on those assumptions, Rutherford and 
Ray (2009) raise two different types of versions 
of the selection task with social contracts, so that 
both autistic participants and non-autistic partic-
ipants execute them. In the fi rst kind of selection 
task, participants are asked to detect cheaters 
and, in the second one, they are asked to look 
for individuals that, acting honestly, unintention-
ally infringe a rule. The most remarkable aspect 
of their research is that, in the two experimen-
tal groups, the versions with malicious cheat-
ers clearly leaded, with signifi cant differences, 
to more correct answers than the versions with 
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honest individuals, and that the results in this 
way offered by the autistic group were not sig-
nifi cantly different from the results offered by 
the non-autistic group.
This is surprising because the versions of the 
task with malicious cheaters used by Rutherford 
and Ray show, obviously, individuals that act 
without intention to accomplish their part of the 
agreement. On the other hand, the other versions 
maintain the same scenarios and only change this 
aspect (that is, describe people that also violate 
norms but without intention to infringe them). 
Thus, it can be thought that the negative results 
obtained in the versions with honest individuals 
and the positive results obtained in the versions 
with malicious cheaters reveal that it is not clear 
that autistic people cannot note other people’s 
intentions.
Nonetheless, it is possible to interpret the re-
sults presented by Rutherford and Ray (2009) 
in other ways. For this reason, it can also be 
thought that such results do not really provide 
information about the relationship that can exist 
between autism and a possible theory of mind 
defi cit. It seems that the different versions of the 
selection task used by Rutherford and Ray are 
not truly comparable between themselves, and 
the next parts of this paper try to demonstrate 
it. However, previously, it can be appropriate to 
explain in greater detail, and more clearly, the 
fundamental characteristics of the texts used by 
Rutherford and Ray (2009).
2. TWO STORIES: THE DINNER PARTY 
AND THE SOLDIERS
Four versions of the Wason selection task are 
raised by Rutherford and Ray (2009). Two ver-
sions are based on a story about a dinner party 
and the other two versions are based on the work 
that must be realized by certain soldiers. As 
indicated above, each of the two versions cor-
responding to each story, describes individuals 
with different ethical attitudes. In one case, the 
individuals commit an Innocent Mistake and, 
in the other case, the individuals are, clearly, 
Cheaters.
Rutherford and Ray (2009) call their versions 
WST1, WST2, WST3, and WST4. WST are the 
acronyms taken from the expression Wason Se-
lection Task, and the numbers are used in order 
to organize and distinguish those versions. In 
this way, WST1 and WST2 refer to the party din-
ner story, and WST3 and WST4 refer to the sol-
diers story. WST1 and WST3 are versions with 
an innocent mistake, that is, versions that show 
honest individuals that infringe the rule without 
malicious intent, and WST2 and WST4 are tasks 
related to cheating individuals, that is, tasks re-
lated to individuals that violate the norm with 
malicious intent.
In particular, in WST1, the participant is asked 
to imagine that is going to invite some friends to 
a dinner party, and that he (or she) has no time to 
prepare food. Thus, he (or she) establishes this 
rule:
“If you want to come to my party, then 
you must bring a food dish to the party” 
(Rutherford and Ray, 2009, p.114, bold in 
text).
Nevertheless, he (or she) knows that his (or 
her) friends, in some cases, are very busy and, 
in other cases, do not prepare food perfectly. For 
these reasons, he (or she) knows that, although 
they want to collaborate with food, not all of his 
(or her) friends are going to follow the rule.
The participant can see four cards. Each card 
refers to one person, and one side of these cards 
indicates whether or not that person collaborated 
with food and the other side indicates whether 
or not that person accepted the invitation. In this 
way, the participant is shown “brought a food 
dish” (Rutherford and Ray, 2009, p.114) on the 
fi rst card, “Did not bring a food dish” (Ruther-
ford and Ray, 2009, p.114) on the second card, 
“Is at your dinner party” (Rutherford and Ray, 
2009, p.114) on the third card, and “Is not at your 
dinner party” (Rutherford and Ray, 2009, p.114) 
on the fourth card. In this scenario, the partici-
pant must choose the card or the cards that it is 
necessary to review (observing its hidden side) 
in order to detect friends that infringe the rule.
It is easy to deduce the logically correct an-
swer in this version if each card is analyzed sep-
arately:
-Brought a food dish: it does not need to be cho-
sen. If its other side shows Is at your dinner par-
ty, the card refers to a friend that has followed 
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the rule, and, if its other side shows Is not at your 
dinner party, the card can refer, for example, to 
an altruist friend that, although he (or she) did 
not join the dinner party, collaborated in prepar-
ing it. In any case, this person did not violate the 
rule.
-Did not bring a food dish: this card must be se-
lected because, if its other side shows Is at your 
dinner party, it refers to a friend that did not fol-
low the rule.
-Is at your dinner party: this card must also be 
chosen because, if its other side shows Did not 
bring a food dish, it also refers to a friend that 
did not follow the rule.
-Is not at your dinner party: it does not need to 
be selected because it is not possible that this 
friend has infringed the rule. If he (or she) is not 
at the dinner party, it is irrelevant whether or not 
he (or she) collaborated with food.
WST2 is very similar to WST1. The only dif-
ference is that in WST2 the participant must 
imagine that some of his (or her) friends are 
sluggards and they are not going to collaborate. 
Therefore, the most important difference is that 
in this version the friends can violate the rule 
with malicious intent.
Instead, WST3 describes an army base in 
which contact with the outside world is limited. 
A show is going to be performed shortly but 
there is a rule with regard to it:
“If you go to the concert, then you have 
to work a four-hour shift digging ditches” 
(Rutherford and Ray, 2009, p.116, bold in 
text).
In this version, it is possible that some soldiers 
do not know the rule and that, for this reason, en-
joy the concert without digging, that is, commit 
an innocent mistake.
Again, the participant is shown four cards. In 
this scenario, each card refers to a soldier, and 
one side of these cards indicates whether or not 
that soldier enjoyed the concert and the other side 
indicates whether or not that soldier worked. In 
this way, the participant can see “Worked a shift 
at digging ditches” (Rutherford and Ray, 2009, 
p.116) on the fi rst card, “Did not work a shift 
at digging ditches” (Rutherford and Ray, 2009, 
p.116) on the second card, “Did not go to the 
concert” (Rutherford and Ray, 2009, p.116) on 
the third card, and “Went to the concert” (Ruth-
erford and Ray, 2009, p.116) on the fourth card. 
In this version, the participant is also asked to 
choose the card or the cards that it is necessary 
to check in order to detect individuals that vio-
late the norm.
Given that the logical structure of this ver-
sion is similar to that of the version related to 
the party dinner, the valid cards are also obvious 
in this task. If each card is reviewed separately, 
it can be said, about each of them, the following:
-Worked a shift at digging ditches: it does not 
need to be chosen. If, on its other side, appears 
Went to the concert, the rule has been fulfi lled. 
If, on its other side, appears Did not go to the 
concert, the rule has not been violated because it 
does not establish that, if a soldier digs ditches, 
that soldier must go to the concert. The rule only 
establishes that, if a soldier wants to go to the 
concert, that soldier must dig ditches.
-Did not work a shift at digging ditches: this 
card must be selected because, if its other side 
shows Went to the concert, it refers to a soldier 
that did not follow the rule.
-Did not go to the concert: it does not need to be 
chosen because it is not possible that this soldier 
has violated the rule. If he (or she) did not go to 
the concert, it is irrelevant whether or not he (or 
she) dug ditches.
-Went to the concert: this card must be chosen 
because, if, on its other side, appears Did not 
work a shift at digging ditches, this soldier in-
fringed the rule.
WST4 is very similar to WST3. The differ-
ence between them is that in WST4 the partici-
pant is asked to assume that it is thought that 
some soldiers, intentionally, have not respected 
the rule, that is, that, with the knowledge that 
it is wrong, they have gone to the concert and, 
however, they have not dug ditches. Therefore, 
the only aspect that it is changed is the aspect 
linked to the soldiers’ intentions, because, in 
this version, they know that the rule has been 
established. Obviously, the logically valid cards 
in WST4 are the same as those that have been 
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indicated for WST3.
3. THE HYPOTHESES HELD BY RUTH-
ERFORD AND RAY
As mentioned above, the results obtained by 
Rutherford and Ray (2009) were, in principle, 
rather surprising. Both the autistic group and 
the non-autistic group achieved higher rates of 
correct answers in WST2 and WST4. This fact 
seemed to lead them to several hypotheses:
1.- Indeed, there are mental mechanisms that al-
low detecting cheaters, and those mental mecha-
nisms are not damaged in people with autism.
2.- Their experiment detected a fact that cannot 
be noted by means of other methods: autistic 
people can understand intentions and have, in 
some way, theory of mind.
3.- The selection task describes fi ctitious social 
situations and does not refer to real situations. 
Thus, it is possible that people with autism can 
correctly resolve artifi cial problems in which an 
intention is presented, and that, nevertheless, 
they cannot reason in a similar way in their ev-
eryday life (and that, therefore, they cannot de-
tect real people’s true intentions).
Rutherford and Ray (2009) seem to prefer the 
hypothesis 1. Nonetheless, it can be thought that, 
in fact, none of those hypotheses can be conclu-
sively demonstrated by means of the results of 
their experiment or by means of the results of 
similar experiments, because other reasons can 
be offered in order to explain why WST2 and 
WST4 provide better results than WST1 and 
WST3. It is possible that the positive results 
of both WST2 and WST4 are not related to the 
described characters’ intentions, but to other 
characteristics of those tasks. In this way, other 
variables not controlled by Rutherford and Ray 
(and not linked to evolved mechanisms or adap-
tive rules) can be considered in order to interpret 
the results achieved by general population and 
autistic people in those versions of the Wason se-
lection task. The next sections explain these last 
statements.
4. GENERAL POPULATION AND CHEAT-
ERS DETECTION
It can be appropriate to review, fi rst, the results 
corresponding to the participants that are includ-
ed in the non-autistic group by Rutherford and 
Ray (2009). It can be said that the cards selected 
by them do not reveal evidence that, actually, the 
hypothesis of the social contracts theory refer-
ring to the existence of adaptive mechanisms 
and evolved rules on human mind is correct. As 
indicated, it is possible that WST1 and WST3 
present worse results than WST2 and WST4 for 
several reasons that are not linked to hypotheti-
cal mental abilities for cheaters detection.
The fi rst of those reasons is that all the ver-
sions of the Wason selection task used by Ruth-
erford and Ray (2009) do not have the same 
diffi culty level. WST1 and WST3 are more 
complicated versions, and, therefore, it is less 
easy to process them, to interpret them, and to 
understand them. WST1 and WST2 seem iden-
tical versions in which there is only a different 
paragraph, and something similar can be said 
with regard to WST3 and WST4, in which it 
can also be observed that their only difference is 
one paragraph. However, the problem is that the 
paragraphs corresponding to WST1 and WST3 
present important diffi culties that cannot be not-
ed in the paragraphs that appear in WST2 and 
WST4.
As far as WST1 and WST2 are concerned, the 
different paragraph is the third one. In WST1 is 
as follows:
“All of your friends who can go to your dinner par-
ty tell you that they can make a dish for the party. 
However, you know that some of them are really 
busy with work and do not have time to cook a dish 
for the dinner party tomorrow night but they really 
would like to go. You also know that some of your 
friends are not good cooks and may make an honest 
attempt to cook their dish but burn the food so that 
it cannot be brought to the party. So some of your 
friends may have broken this rule, you must fi nd out 
if they have broken this rule” (Rutherford and Ray, 
2009, p.114).
Nonetheless, in WST2 this paragraph is deleted 
and this other appears in its place:
“All of your friends who can go to your dinner par-
ty tell you that they can make a dish for the party. 
Your friends are supposed to follow this rule but you 
suspect that some of them will be too lazy to make 
food and intentionally not bring a food dish to the 
party. So some of your friends may have broken this 
rule, you must fi nd out if they have broken this rule” 
(Rutherford and Ray, 2009, p.115).
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It is clear that WST1 has a characteristic that 
makes it a more diffi cult task. It is a longer text. 
Undoubtedly, the fact that there are more words 
in a text leads to a harder processing, and this 
circumstance, by itself, can explain why the 
participants select fewer logically valid cards in 
WST1.
But, if this fact is not considered to be enough, 
it can also be thought that, while WST2 raises 
only one hypothesis, that is, that the friends are 
very lazy to cook, WST1 raises two hypotheses, 
that is, that some friends have a lot of work to do 
and that other are bad cooks. Obviously, this cir-
cumstance could also infl uence the poor results 
that were offered by the participants in WST1. In 
addition to more sophisticated refl ections, more 
complicated information processings, and more 
diffi cult mental representations elaborations, 
two hypotheses need to establish more relation-
ships between concepts.
Besides, other important point is that WST1 
in itself is not a coherent and consistent text. It 
exposes that there are honest individuals that 
cannot follow the rule because they have a lot of 
work or they are bad cooks. However, by con-
sidering that information, the participants can 
think that, if they are really honest, those indi-
viduals are not going to infringe the rule if they 
can avoid it. The participants can suppose that 
an individual with truly good intentions is not 
going to go to the party without a dish, even if 
he (or she) has justifi able reasons for this. An in-
dividual authentically honest knows that, if he 
(or she) cannot follow the rule and cook a food 
dish, he (or she) cannot go to the dinner party, 
even if the causes of this situation are beyond 
his (or her) control. He (or she) also knows that, 
if he (or she) goes to the party, at least, he (or 
she) must talk to the host about this problem. It 
is because of this that, in this scenario, the host 
does not really need to check whether their hon-
est friends have followed the rule. Thus, it can be 
thought that the story described in WST1 can be 
interpreted by the participant as an implausible 
story, and doing so the task cannot be adequately 
executed.
For these reasons, it can be stated that the 
paragraphs of WST1 and WST2 are so differ-
ent that their results cannot be compared, and 
that those tasks cannot be used in order to prove 
that human beings have evolved mechanisms 
that lead them to detect individuals that violate 
agreements. Therefore, it seems that those two 
versions of the task do not reveal the existence 
of the mentioned mechanisms.
But the relationship that can be established 
between WST3 and WST4 is very similar. The 
paragraphs that are different in these versions 
are so disparate that it is also inappropriate to 
compare their results. Again, the third paragraph 
is the important paragraph. In WST3, it is as fol-
lows:
“The soldiers are supposed to follow this rule but 
you suspect that some of them were not aware of 
the commanding offi cers order to dig the ditches. 
They may have made an honest mistake and gone to 
the show without digging the ditches. So they may 
have broken this rule, you must fi nd out if they have 
broken this rule” (Rutherford and Ray, 2009, p.116).
However, in WST4, the third paragraph is the 
following:
“The soldiers are supposed to follow this rule but 
you suspect that some of them have skipped their 
duties intentionally and still went to the concert. So 
they may have broken this rule, you must fi nd out 
if they have broken this rule” (Rutherford and Ray, 
2009, p.117).
It is true that WST3 is not as WST1 because 
WST3 does not raise two hypotheses (and, there-
fore, in this particular way, it is not more diffi -
cult than WST4). Nevertheless, it can be easily 
appreciated that the paragraph of WST3 is lon-
ger than the paragraph of WST4. As far as the 
number of words is concerned, the difference be-
tween WST3 and WST4 is not as obvious as the 
difference between WST1 and WST2, but the 
paragraph of WST3 is, in essence, more exten-
sive than that of WST4, and this circumstance is 
very probable to infl uence participants’ selection. 
As indicated above with regard to WST1 and 
WST2, a longer paragraph needs a more elabo-
rate information processing and a more complex 
mental representations elaboration. In this way, 
this fact, by itself, can question the hypotheses 
held by Rutherford and Ray (2009), because it 
demonstrates that the intentions assigned to the 
characters are not the only differences between 
WST3 and WST4.
However, the most controversial point related 
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to WST3 and WST4 can be that these tasks are 
only similar in appearance. Actually, each of 
them asks the participants to think about different 
situations. In WST4, the rule is established and 
it is necessary to look for cheaters. Nevertheless, 
there is a different situation in WST3 because a 
previous work needs to be made: it is necessary 
to check whether the rule is really established 
(recall that, in WST3, the participant is not sure 
that the soldiers know the order). Although it is 
explicitly indicated that it is necessary to check 
whether some soldiers have infringed the norm, 
the general context in WST3 suggests that it is 
important to verify that the soldiers know that 
they must dig if they want to go to the concert. 
If the participant understands the task in this last 
way, he (or she) can choose not to elect the card 
Did not work a shift at digging ditches, one of 
the logically correct cards, but the card Worked 
a shift at digging ditches, because this last card 
can show Went to the concert on its other side, 
and a card with Worked a shift at digging ditches 
on one of its sides and Went to the concert on its 
other side can increase his (or her) confi dence 
that the rule was adequately understood. Indeed, 
this argument is not a new argument. Yachanin 
and Tweney (1982) noted that all the versions of 
the selection task do not present the same prob-
lem. Some of the versions present the rule as an 
existing and current rule, and it is necessary to 
check whether or not such a rule is followed. 
However, other versions present the rule as a 
hypothetical rule, and it is necessary to check 
whether or not the rule really exists. Obviously, 
the versions of this second type are more diffi -
cult and WST3 can be thought of as a version 
of this type, while WST4 can be thought of as 
a version of the fi rst type. Therefore, it can be 
said that WST3 is a task more complicated than 
WST4 and that it is not appropriate to compare 
their results.
Based on the previous arguments, it can be 
accepted that the experiment presented by Ruth-
erford and Ray (2009) does not prove that peo-
ple have mental abilities related to detection of 
malicious individuals that deliberately violate 
rules. Certainly, it is incorrect to say that their 
paper shows that such abilities do not exist, but, 
in the same way, it is correct to state that their 
results do not demonstrate that human beings 
have adapted and evolved mechanisms linked to 
cheaters detection.
Nevertheless, the preceding analysis has only 
considered the results obtained by the non-autis-
tic participants (representing general population) 
in the experiment presented by Rutherford and 
Ray (2009). The next part of this paper revises, 
from this same perspective, the results corre-
sponding to the autistic group.
5. AUTISM AND CHEATERS DETECTION
It The previous arguments seem to indicate 
that, based on the experiment raised by Ruther-
ford and Ray (2009), it is not possible to fi nd 
evidence about the relationship between autism 
and a theory of mind defi cit. Apparently, the 
cards selected by the autistic participants in their 
versions of the selection task support the hypoth-
esis that, in a certain way, they can detect other 
people’s intentions, but the preceding arguments 
can be also applied to the autistic participants’ 
results.
Indeed, a correct execution of WST2 and 
WST4 does not need an ability related to a theory 
of mind. As indicated, the characters’ intentions 
are not the only differences between WST1 and 
WST2, and between WST3 and WST4. There 
are more differences, which, as also mentioned, 
refer to the length of the texts, their internal con-
tradictions, and the type of problem that must be 
solved (the versions do not ask to do the same in 
all the cases), and such differences can also af-
fect, undoubtedly, the experimental group with 
autism. It is necessary to consider that papers 
such as that by Pijnacker et al. (2009) reveal that 
autistic people can integrate and process new 
linguistic information. Therefore, it can be sup-
posed that differences existing between the ver-
sions used by Rutherford and Ray (2009) can 
also infl uence people with autism.
In this way, it can be said that, in the experi-
ment proposed by Rutherford and Ray (2009), 
the autistic participants were infl uenced by facts 
such as that some versions transmit more infor-
mation than other versions, that the situation de-
scribed in WST1 is inconsistent, and that WST3 
is different from the other three tasks. The four 
tasks have the same logical structure but the 
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mentioned aspects could affect the participants 
with autism in the same way as general popula-
tion.
From this perspective, the results offered by 
Rutherford and Ray (2009) do not clearly sup-
port any of the three hypotheses raised by them 
in order to explain the selections made by their 
participants. The fi rst of those hypotheses, which 
is the hypothesis that they seem to prefer, refers 
to the idea that human mind has a mechanism 
that is preserved in autistic people and that leads 
to detect offenders. This idea is not demonstrat-
ed by their experiment because logical and lin-
guistic criteria can explain why their versions of 
the selection task had different results. WST2 
and WST4 have a structure that causes that the 
participants (autistic and non-autistic) select the 
logically valid cards. On the other hand, WST1 
and WST3 have internal problems that hamper 
the correct selections in the two experimental 
groups.
Their second hypothesis suggests that the 
methods used by them have shown results that 
other methods cannot show, that is, that the 
methods used by them have shown that people 
with autism have a certain theory of mind. How-
ever, the arguments exposed in this paper clarify 
that the results offered by Rutherford and Ray 
(2009) do not indicate that their participants 
necessarily had a theory of mind. If they had a 
minimum logical ability and were capable of 
processing linguistic information, they could get 
such results.
Finally, their third hypothesis raises that au-
tistic people can only detect other people’s in-
tentions in fi ctional situations, but not in real 
circumstances or in daily life. Nevertheless, as 
explained, the characters’ intentions are not the 
most important factors of the versions used by 
Rutherford and Ray (2009). What matters more 
is the internal structure of those versions. As a 
consequence, if people with autism have diffi -
culties in real contexts, it is not proved by Ruth-
erford and Ray (2009).
Thus, it seems that the results of the experi-
ment presented by Rutherford and Ray (2009) 
cannot be used in order to solve problems related 
to the possible theory of mind defi cit in autism. 
Nonetheless, their experiment is relevant and it 
must be acknowledged. Their experiment offers 
important information concerning autistic mind 
and its possibilities to process natural language 
and to reason. In particular, such an experiment 
shows that autistic people can understand logi-
cal exercises (a signifi cant proportion of their 
autistic participants solve WST2 and WST4), 
that the length of the texts infl uences them in 
the same way as it infl uences general population 
(the results achieved by the autistic participants 
in WST1 and WST3, which are more extensive 
tasks, are worse), that they note contradictions in 
texts (it seems that the inconsistency of WST1 is 
noted by the autistic participants), and that they 
are capable of understanding the instructions of 
different exercises (it also seems that the autistic 
participants understand that WST3 is a different 
task and that such a task does not ask to detect 
cheaters, but to check whether or not the rule is 
known). These fi ndings are, obviously, important 
for a teacher that works with autistic students.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has not tried to demonstrate that 
autistic people have problems linked to a theory 
of mind defi cit, but to show that the experiment 
offered by Rutherford and Ray (2009) cannot be 
used in order to check whether or not people with 
autism have such problems, because their results 
can also be explained if other mental abilities are 
considered. However, their research reveals im-
portant information. It shows that it is possible 
that autistic people have relevant intellectual 
abilities that must be taken into account by edu-
cationalists. It also shows that, through such in-
tellectual abilities, autistic students can execute 
academic activities that, at fi rst, can seem to be 
impossible for them. Therefore, more research 
about autistic intellectual behavior is needed in 
case we wish to offer an appropriate educational 
answer for autistic students. Maybe the diffi culty 
is that purely quantitative analyses, such as those 
of Rutherford and Ray (2009), do not revise im-
portant aspects. As indicated, the participants’ 
choices in the selection task may be due to dif-
ferent causes and reasons, and such choices can 
be interpreted in accordance with various frame-
works and perspectives.
The Wason selection task is a reasoning ex-
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ercise in which participants’ choices are not the 
only relevant data. It is also interesting to know 
the causes of such choices. It seems that, if the 
choices are only statistically reviewed, those 
causes cannot be detected and this fact raises a 
diffi culty. It is possible that other methods are 
necessary, for example, methods such as those 
used by Van Lambalgen and Smid (2004) or 
Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2001), which re-
fer to the need to interview participants by means 
of Socratic dialogues tutorials. Given that, evi-
dently, it can be thought that those methods are 
the only methods that can reveal the true causes 
of the choices in the Wason selection task, it 
seems appropriate to raise researches in this 
way. Such researches can provide important in-
formation for being used in classrooms in which 
it is aimed that diversity in general and autistic 
students in particular are adequately considered. 
And it is important to keep in mind that even the 
arguments that have been exposed in the previ-
ous pages need a confi rmation, which can be got 
through interviews with participants in which 
the real reasons of their choices are explained by 
them.
Thus, theses such as those indicated above, 
that is, the thesis that autistic people can make 
logical inferences, the thesis that the amount of 
the linguistic information that is transmitted can 
infl uence them, the thesis that they can detect 
inconsistent stories, and the thesis that they can 
distinguish types of reasoning tasks, need to be 
validated by means of qualitative researches in 
which the participants show the intellectual pro-
cesses followed by them in order to solve certain 
exercises. . This research work becomes urgent 
in case scientists think that autistic people can 
have potentialities that can surprise, if known.
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